

JUN 3 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : CIA/Theater Commander Relationships

REFERENCE : a. Memo for ADPC, subject, "Comments on Staff Study on the Function and Status of the Political Adviser in a Military Theater of Operations."

b. Letter from John Hildring to Dr. Greenfield dated August 7, 1950.

1. The problem under consideration at the present time concerns itself with clarifying the relationship between Senior CIA/opc Representative and the Theater Commander in time of war.

2. To a minor extent, this reflects past discussions on the relationship of a political adviser to the Theater Commander, and hereunder are set forth some attempts at deriving insight into both of these areas.

3. The traditional American concept of waging war has been motivated by a two-fold desire to achieve victory with efficiency and speed in such a way as to minimize American loss of life. It has not been traditional for Americans to consider the subtleties of the political consequences of military actions, probably because of our traditional reluctance to engage ourselves in European politics.

4. World War II has shown conclusively that the United States has reached a point in its development where any actions taken officially or unofficially, whether they be political, economic, or military, have the

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economic, and military ~~facts~~ ^{events}.

5. The problem can best be considered if it is broken down into its component parts:

a. The relationship of political adviser to military commander in time of general war is discussed in reference a.

b. The relationship between CIA/opc and the military commander is on an inferior level to a, above, and is more technical in nature. Since OpC actions of a military nature would be guided by, and with the consent of, the theater commander, other activities in support of political policies would be guided by the policies and guidance of the Executive agencies responsible for directing such policies; ie, Department of State, the National Security Council, and the PSB.

6. It would seem that there would be little problem in determining the exact relationship between OpC and the military commander if the larger problem of clarifying the relationship of the political adviser to the theater commander in time of general war could be clearly determined. Reference a includes the recommendation that this problem be considered by the National Security Council. It is not known whether this recommendation has received any follow-up.

7. It is of doubtful importance that the present situation in the Far Eastern Command should be accepted as an example on a smaller scale of both the relationships in question above. The Korean situation is confined to a particular area and is not a general, but an isolated war. As such, it has far more political overtones than would a general war with the USSR,

for instance. Tacit support for this contention may be seen in the fact that

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MacArthur, who expressed the old traditional concept of victory with efficiency and dispatch was overruled. This overruling was probably the result of an awareness on the part of American policymakers that victory in combat does not necessarily mean victory in the field of politics.

8. The JCS has considerably delimited the political prerogatives of the theater commander and it is clear that the JCS intend that political power as was exercised by MacArthur and Eisenhower shall be a thing of the past; that policy guidance will henceforth be transmitted directly from JCS to the field. This further supports the contention that there is top level awareness of the political implications of military actions; it will serve to check the theater commander and make him responsive to the Executive will, and it may successfully provide long and even short-range guidance, but the inadequacies of this setup are evident in such a thing as the Kojima uprisings. In this situation the JCS had to wait for two weeks for a report, and, in the meantime, the political damage had been done. It is possible that a political adviser for the Far East Headquarters might have helped to resolve the Kojima dilemma in some of its political aspects.

9. In the event of a general war, the role to be played by CIA and the political implications of that role have not been clearly foreseen, but it is reasonable to assume that many covert operations can maintain themselves during a period of general war and be reactivated when hostilities cease, to form the nucleus of an indigenous governmental organization which can support the military occupation government. Attached reference b outlines military government problems which arose during World War II and explains in outline

the need again for proper political guidance for military commanders.

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10. It might be stressed that political training on the operational level could many times alleviate much of the demand for political guidance on the upper levels, simply by virtue of the fact that mistakes would not be made if the individuals concerned with political liaison ^{and} ~~in~~ military occupation were sufficiently trained to interpret American interests in their spheres of activity.

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
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FROM



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